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1. Paul Krugman 
On 2 July of this year, after months of asserting that it would do no such thing, 
the government of Thailand abandoned its efforts to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate for the baht. The currency quickly depreciated by more than 20 percent; 
within a few days most neighboring countries had been forced to emulate the 
Thai example. 
What  forced Thailand to  devalue its currency was  massive  speculation 
against the baht, speculation that over a few months had consumed most of 
what initially seemed an awesomely large war chest of foreign exchange. And 
why  were speculators betting against Thailand? Because they expected the 
baht to be devalued, of course. 
This sort of circular logic-in  which investors flee a currency because they 
expect it to be devalued, and much (though usually not all) of the pressure on 
the currency comes precisely because of this investor lack of confidence-is 
the defining feature of  a currency crisis. We  need not seek a more formal or 
careful definition; almost always we know a currency crisis when we see one. 
And we have been seeing a lot of them lately. The 1990s have, in fact, offered 
the spectacle of  three distinct regional waves  of  currency crises: Europe in 
1992-93,  Latin America in 1994-95,  and the Asian crises still unfolding at the 
time of writing. 
Currency crises have been the subject of  an extensive economic literature, 
both theoretical and empirical. Yet  there remain some important unresolved 
issues, and each new set of crises presents new puzzles. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide an overview both of what we know and of what we do not 
know about currency crises, illustrated by reference to recent experience. 
The paper begins by  describing the “canonical” crisis model, a simple yet 
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suggestive analysis that was developed twenty years ago but remains the start- 
ing point for most discussion. Despite that canonical model’s virtues, however, 
it has come in for justified criticism because of its failure to offer a realistic 
picture either of the objectives of central banks or of the constraints they face; 
thus the paper turns next to a description of “second-generation” crisis models 
that try to remedy these defects. 
As it turns out, second-generation models have suggested a reconsideration 
of  a basic question that the canonical model seemed to have  answered: are 
currency crises always justified? That is, do currencies always get attacked 
because the markets perceive (rightly or wrongly) some underlying inconsis- 
tency in the nation’s policies, or can they happen arbitrarily to countries whose 
currencies would otherwise have remained sound? The paper describes several 
different scenarios for currency crises that are not driven by fundamentals, in- 
cluding self-fulfilling crises in which endogenous policy ends up justifying in- 
vestor pessimism, “herding” by investors, and the machinations of large agents 
(“Soroi”). Closely related to the question of arbitrary crises is “contagion,” the 
phenomenon in which a currency crisis in one country often seems to trigger 
crises in other countries with which it seemingly has only weak economic links 
(e.g., Mexico and Argentina, or Thailand and the Philippines). 
From there the paper moves to cases, considering in turn the three regional 
crisis waves  of  the  1990s (so far). Comparison of  these waves turns out to 
raise a further puzzle: while the onset of crisis was similar in each case, the 
consequences of the crises seem to have been very different in the European 
as opposed to the Latin and Asian cases. 
Finally, of course, we must ask the big question: is there any way  to make 
crises less frequent, and if so what? 
8.1.1  The Canonical Crisis Model 
The canonical crisis model derives from work done in the mid-1970s by 
Stephen Salant, at that time at the Federal Reserve’s International Finance Sec- 
tion. Salant’s concern was not with currency crises but with the pitfalls of 
schemes to stabilize commodity prices. Such price stabilization, via the estab- 
lishment of international agencies that would buy and sell commodities, was a 
major demand of proponents of the so-called New International Economic Or- 
der (NIEO). Salant, however, argued on theoretical grounds that such schemes 
would be subject to devastating speculative attacks. 
His starting point was the proposition that speculators will hold an exhaust- 
ible resource if and only if they expect its price to rise rapidly enough to offer 
them a rate of return equivalent (after adjusting for risk) to that on other assets. 
This proposition is the basis of  the famous Hotelling model of  exhaustible 
resource pricing: the price of such a resource should rise over time at the rate 
of interest, with the level of the price path determined by the requirement that 
the resource just be exhausted by  the time the price has risen to the “choke 
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But what will happen, asked Salant, if an official price stabilization board 
announces its willingness to buy or sell the resource at some fixed price? As 
long as the price is’  above the level that would prevail in the absence of  the 
board-that  is, above the Hotelling path-speculators  will sell off their hold- 
ings, reasoning that they can no longer expect to realize capital gains. Thus the 
board will initially find itself acquiring a large stockpile. Eventually, however, 
the price that  would  have prevailed  without  the stabilization scheme-the 
“shadow price”-will  rise above the board’s target. At that point speculators 
will regard the commodity as a desirable asset and will begin buying it up; if 
the board continues to try to stabilize the price, it will quickly-instantane- 
ously, in the model-find  its stocks exhausted. Salant pointed out that a huge 
wave of speculative buying had in effect forced the closure of the open market 
in gold in 1969 and suggested that a similar fate would await NIEO price stabi- 
lization schemes. 
This basic logic was described briefly in a classic 1978 paper by Salant and 
his colleague Dale Henderson (their main concern in that paper was with the 
more recent behavior of the gold price, and in particular with the effects of 
unpredictable sales of  official gold stocks). Other researchers soon realized, 
however, that similar logic could be applied to speculative attacks not on com- 
modity boards trying to stabilize commodity prices but on central banks trying 
to stabilize exchange rates. 
The canonical currency crisis model, as laid out initially by Krugman (1979) 
and refined by Flood and Garber (1984), was designed to mimic the commod- 
ity board story. The upward trend in the “shadow” price of foreign exchange- 
the price that would prevail after the speculative attack-was  supplied by  as- 
suming that the government of the target economy was engaged in steady, un- 
controllable issue of money to finance a budget deficit. Despite this trend, the 
central bank was assumed to try to hold the exchange rate fixed using a stock of 
foreign exchange reserves, which it stood ready to buy or sell at the target rate. 
Given this stylized representation of the situation, the logic of currency cri- 
sis was the same as that of speculative attack on a commodity stock. Suppose 
speculators were to wait until the reserves were exhausted in the natural course 
of events. At that point they would know that the price of  foreign exchange, 
fixed up to now, would begin rising; this would make holding foreign exchange 
more attractive than holding domestic currency, leading to a jump in the ex- 
change rate. But foresighted speculators, realizing that such a jump was in 
prospect,  would  sell  domestic currency just  before  the  exhaustion of  re- 
serves-and  in so doing advance the date of that exhaustion, leading specula- 
tors to sell even earlier, and so on. . . .  The result would be that when reserves 
fell to some critical level-perhaps  a level that might seem large enough to 
finance years of payments deficits-there  would be an abrupt speculative at- 
tack that would quickly drive those reserves to zero and force an abandonment 
of the fixed exchange rate. 
The canonical currency crisis model, then, explains such crises as the result 
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sistence of  money-financed budget deficits-and  the attempt to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate. This inconsistency can be temporarily papered over if the 
central bank has sufficiently large reserves, but when these reserves become 
inadequate speculators force the issue with a wave of selling. 
This model has some important virtues. First of  all, many currency crises 
clearly do reflect a basic inconsistency between domestic and exchange rate 
policy; the specific, highly simplified form of that discrepancy in the canonical 
model may be viewed as a metaphor for the more complex but often equally 
stark policy incoherence of many exchange regimes. Second, the model dem- 
onstrates clearly that the abrupt, billions-lost-in-days character of  runs on a 
currency need not reflect either investor irrationality or the schemes of market 
manipulators. It can be simply the result of the logic of the situation, in which 
holding a currency will become unattractive once its price is no longer stabi- 
lized, and the end of the price stabilization is itself triggered by the speculative 
flight of capital. 
These insights are important, especially as a corrective to the tendency of 
observers unfamiliar with the logic of  currency crises to view them as some- 
how outside the normal universe of economic events-whether  as a revelation 
that markets have been taken over by  chaos theory, that “virtual money” has 
now overpowered the real economy (Drucker 1997), or as prima facie evidence 
of malevolent market manipulation. 
Despite the virtues of  the canonical model, however, a number of econo- 
mists have argued that it is an inadequate representation of the forces at work 
in  most real  crises. These economists have developed what are sometimes 
known as “second-generation’’ crisis models, to which we now turn. 
8.1.2  More Sophisticated Models 
Perhaps the best way  to describe what is wrong with the canonical crisis 
model is to say that it represents government policy (though not the market re- 
sponse) in a very mechanical way. The government is assumed to blindly keep 
on printing money to cover a budget deficit, regardless of the external situation; 
the central bank is assumed to doggedly sell foreign exchange to peg the ex- 
change rate until the last dollar of  reserves is gone. In reality the range of 
possible policies is much wider. Governments can and do try to condition fiscal 
policies on the balance of payments. Meanwhile, central banks have a variety 
of  tools other than exchange market intervention available to defend the ex- 
change rate, including in particular the ability to tighten domestic monetary 
policies. Obviously there are costs to such policies; but it may be important to 
recognize that the defense of an exchange rate is a matter of trade-offs rather 
than a simple matter of selling foreign exchange until the money is gone. 
So-called second-generation models, perhaps best represented by  Obstfeld 
(1994), require three ingredients. First, there must be a reason why the govern- 
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reason why the government would like to defend the exchange rate-so  that 
there is a tension between these motives. Finally, in order to create the circular 
logic that drives a crisis, the cost of defending a fixed rate must itself increase 
when people expect (or at least suspect) that the rate might be abandoned. 
Why might a government have a motive to allow its currency to depreciate? 
The general slogan here is “It takes two nominals to make a real.” In order for 
a government to have a real incentive to change the exchange rate, something 
must be awkwardly fixed in domestic currency. One obvious possibility is a 
large debt burden denominated in domestic currency-a  burden that a govern- 
ment might be tempted to inflate away but cannot as long as it is committed to 
a fixed exchange rate. (E.g., the attacks on the French franc during the 1920s 
were triggered mainly by suspicions that the government might try to inflate 
away its legacy of debt from World War I.) Another possibility is that the coun- 
try suffers from unemployment due to downwardly rigid nominal wage rates 
and would like to adopt a more expansionary monetary policy but cannot as 
long as it is committed to a fixed exchange rate. (This was in essence the mo- 
tivation both for Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard in  1931 and its 
departure from  the  Exchange  Rate Mechanism-EM-of  the  European 
Monetary System in 1992.) 
Given a motive to depreciate, why would a government choose instead to 
defend a fixed rate? One answer might be that it believes that a fixed rate is 
important in facilitating international trade and investment. Another might be 
that it has a history of inflation and regards a fixed rate as a guarantor of credi- 
bility. Finally, the exchange rate often takes on an important role as a symbol of 
national pride or commitment to international cooperation (as in the European 
Monetary System). 
Finally, why would public lack of confidence in the maintenance of a fixed 
rate itself have the effect of  making that rate more difficult to defend? Here 
there is a somewhat subtle distinction between two variants of the story. Some 
modelers-notably  Obstfeld  (1994)-emphasize  that  a  fixed  rate  will  be 
costly to defend if  people expected in the past that it would be depreciated 
now. For example, debt holders might have demanded a high rate of interest in 
anticipation of  a depreciation, therefore making the current debt burden so 
large that it is hard to manage without a depreciation. Or unions, expecting de- 
preciation, might have set wages at levels that leave the country’s industry un- 
competitive at the current exchange rate. 
The alternative (which to my mind seems much closer to what happens in 
real crises) is to suppose that a fixed rate is costly to defend if  people now 
expect that it will be depreciated in the future. The usual channel involves 
short-term interest rates: to defend the currency in the face of expectations of 
future depreciation requires high short-term rates; but such high rates may ei- 
ther worsen the cash flow of the government (or indebted enterprises) or de- 
press output and employment. 
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ate, another reason not to depreciate, and some reason why expectations of  a 
depreciation themselves alter the balance between the costs and benefits of 
maintaining a fixed parity. As pointed out in Krugman (1996), it is possible to 
combine these elements to produce a general story about currency crises that 
is quite similar to that in the canonical model. Suppose that a country’s funda- 
mental trade-off between the costs of  maintaining the current parity and the 
costs of abandoning it is predictably deteriorating, so that at some future date 
the country would be likely to devalue even in the absence of a speculative at- 
tack. Then speculators would surely try to get out of the currency ahead of that 
devaluation-but  in so doing they would worsen the government’s trade-off, 
leading to an earlier devaluation. Smart investors, realizing this, would try to 
get out still earlier . . . the end result will therefore be a crisis that ends the 
fixed exchange rate regime well before the fundamentals would appear to make 
devaluation necessary. 
We can actually be more specific: given an inevitable eventual abandonment 
of a currency peg and perfectly informed investors, a speculative attack on a 
currency will occur at the earliest date at which such an attack could succeed. 
The reason is essentially arbitrage: an attack at any later date would offer spec- 
ulators a sure profit; this profit will be competed away by attempts to anticipate 
the crisis. 
It is important to notice an important point about this scenario. In the case 
just described-as  in the canonical model-the  crisis is ultimately provoked 
by the inconsistency of government policies, which make the long-run survival 
of the fixed rate impossible. In that sense the crisis is driven by economic fun- 
damentals. Yet that is not the way it might seem when the crisis actually strikes: 
the government of  the target country would feel that it was fully prepared to 
maintain the exchange rate for a long time and would in fact have done so, yet 
was forced to abandon it by a speculative attack that made defending the rate 
simply too expensive. 
I think that it is fair to say that the standard reaction both of most economists 
and of  international officials to currency crises is, at least informally, based 
on something like the scenario just described. That is, they recognize that the 
speculative attack, driven by expectations of devaluation, was itself the main 
proximate reason for devaluation; yet  they regard the whole process as ulti- 
mately caused by  the policies of the attacked country, and in particular by  a 
conflict between domestic objectives and the currency peg that made an even- 
tual collapse of that peg inevitable. In effect, the financial markets simply bring 
home the news, albeit sooner than the country might have wanted to hear it. 
A significant number of economists studying this issue do, however, believe 
that the complaints of countries that they are being unfairly or arbitrarily at- 
tacked have at least some potential merit. So let me turn to the possible ways 
that-especially  in  the  context  of  second-generation models-such  com- 
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8.1.3  Disputed Issues 
I have just argued that although the detailed workings of a second-generation 
currency crisis model may be very different from those of the original models, 
the general result can be much the same: a currency crisis is essentially the 
result of  policies inconsistent with the long-run maintenance of  a fixed ex- 
change rate. Financial markets simply force the issue and indeed must do so 
as long as investors are forward looking. 
However, it is possible to conceive of  a number of  circumstances under 
which the financial markets are not as blameless as all that. The list below may 
not include all the relevant scenarios, but it seems to cover the cases most of- 
ten mentioned. 
Self-Fulfilling Crises 
Suppose that, contrary to our earlier assumption, an eventual end to a cur- 
rency peg is not completely preordained. There may be no worsening trend in 
the fundamentals; or there may be an adverse trend, but at least some realistic 
possibility that policies may change in a way that reverses that trend. Nonethe- 
less, it may be the case that the government will abandon the peg if faced with 
a sufficiently severe speculative attack. 
The result in such cases will be the possibility of  self-fulfilling exchange 
rate crises. An individual investor will not pull his money out of the country if 
he believes that the currency regime is in no imminent danger; but he will do 
so if  a currency collapse seems likely. A crisis, however, will materialize pre- 
cisely if  many individual investors do pull their money out. The result is that 
either optimism or pessimism will be self-confirming; and in the case of self- 
confirming pessimism, a country will be justified in claiming that it suffered 
an unnecessary crisis. 
How seriously should we take this analysis? One obvious caveat understood 
by the economists studying this issue, but perhaps too easily forgotten by polit- 
ical figures, is that this analysis does not imply either that any currency can be 
subject to speculative attack or that all speculative attacks are unjustified by 
fundamentals. Even in models with self-fulfilling features, it is only when fun- 
damentals-such  as foreign exchange reserves, the government fiscal position, 
the political commitment of the government to the exchange regime-are  suf- 
ficiently weak that the country is potentially vulnerable to speculative attack. 
A country whose government is expected to defend its currency firmly and ef- 
fectively will probably not need to do so, while a country whose government is 
very likely to abandon its peg eventually in any case will almost surely find its 
timetable accelerated by speculative pressure. Or to put it a bit differently: one 
can think of a range of fundamentals in which a crisis cannot happen, and a 
range of fundamentals in which it must happen; at most, self-fulfilling crisis 
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need not. It is an empirical question (though not an easy one) how wide this 
range is. 
It is also important to remember that a country whose fundamentals are per- 
sistently and predictably  deteriorating will necessarily have a crisis at some 
point. Since the logic of predictable crises is that they happen well before the 
fundamentals have reached the point at which the exchange rate would have 
collapsed in the absence of speculative attack-indeed,  as argued above, they 
happen as soon as an attack can “succeed”--it  will always seem at the time 
that the crisis has been provoked by a speculative attack not justified by cur- 
rent fundamentals. 
Let me add a conjecture here, which has not to my knowledge been ad- 
dressed in the theoretical literature to date. A situation in which a crisis could 
happen but need not presents speculators with a “one-way option”: they will 
reap a capital gain (or, if  you measure it in foreign currency, avoid a capital 
loss) by selling domestic currency if the exchange regime collapses but will 
not suffer an equivalent loss if it does not. What, then, prevents them from 
fleeing the currency at even a hint of trouble? My conjecture is that microeco- 
nomic frictions-transaction  costs, the difficulty of arranging credit lines, and 
so on-play  an important role. Ordinarily we think of these frictions as being 
of trivial importance for macroeconomic issues, on the grounds that they are 
only a small fraction of a percentage point of the value transacted. However, 
currency crises unfold over very short periods, in which even small transaction 
costs can offset very large annualized rates of return. It may be small frictions 
that prevent a subjectively low-probability crisis from ballooning into a full- 
fledged speculative attack. If  this is true, then the improving technical effi- 
ciency of  markets may actually be a contributory factor to the frequency of 
currency crises in the 1990s. 
If self-fulfilling crises are a real possibility, what sets them off? The answer 
is that anything could in principle be the trigger. That is, we are now in the 
familiar terrain of “sunspot” dynamics, in which any arbitrary piece of infor- 
mation becomes relevant if market participants believe it is relevant. 
Herding 
Both the canonical currency crisis model and the second-generation models 
presume that foreign exchange markets are efficient-that  is, that they make 
the best use of the available information. There is, however, very little evidence 
that such markets are in fact efficient; on the contrary, the foreign exchange 
market (like financial markets in general) exhibits strong “anomalies” that can 
be reconciled with efficiency, if at all, only with layers of otherwise unpersua- 
sive assumptions that irresistibly suggest the epicycles of pre-Copernican as- 
tronomy. 
What difference might inefficient markets make to the  study of  currency 
crises? The most obvious difference is the possibility of “herding.” In general, 
herding can be exemplified by the result found in Shiller’s (1989) remarkable 429  Currency Crises 
survey of investors during the 1987 stock market crash: the only reason consis- 
tently given by  those selling stocks for their actions was the fact that prices 
were going down. In the context of a currency crisis, of course, such behavior 
could mean that a wave of selling, whatever its initial cause, could be magni- 
fied through sheer imitation and turn, quite literally, into a stampede out of 
the currency. 
Aside from the (very real) biases and limitations of human cognition, why 
might herding occur? Theorists have  proposed two  answers consistent with 
individual rationality. One involves bandwagon effects driven by the awareness 
that investors have private information. Suppose that investor 1 has special in- 
formation about the Thai real estate market, investor 2 has special information 
about the financial condition of the banks, and investor 3 has information about 
the internal discussions of the government. If  investor 1 gets some negative 
information, he may sell, since that is all he has to go on; if investor 2 learns 
that investor 1 has sold, he may sell also even if his own private information is 
neutral or even slightly positive. And investor 3 may then end up selling even 
if his own information is favorable, because the fact that both investors 1 and 2 
have sold leads him to conclude that both may well have received bad news, 
even though in fact they have not. Chari and Kehoe (1996) have argued that 
such bandwagon effects in markets with private information create a sort of 
“hot” money that at least sometimes causes foreign exchange markets to over- 
react to news about national economic prospects. 
Another explanation focuses on the fact that much of the money that has 
been invested in crisis-prone countries is managed by  agents rather than di- 
rectly by  principals. Imagine a pension fund manager investing in emerging 
market funds. She surely has far more to lose from staying in a currently un- 
popular market and turning out to be wrong than she does to gain from sticking 
with the market and turning out to be right. To the extent that money managers 
are compensated based on comparison with other money managers, then, they 
may  have  strong incentives to act alike even if  they have  information sug- 
gesting that the market’s judgment is in fact wrong. (As an aside, herding by 
individual investors may well result from a similar kind of  internal principal 
agent problem; as Schelling 1984 has argued, many aspects of individual be- 
havior make sense only if viewed as the result of a sort of internal struggle be- 
tween agents with longer term and shorter term perspectives. Put it this way: I 
will probably  feel worse if I lose money in a Thai devaluation when others do 
not than I will if I lose the same amount of money in a general rout.) 
A final point: anyone who has followed the currency crises of  the  1990s 
must at least have speculated on what we might call reverse herding. In gen- 
eral, as described at greater length below, the markets seem to have been oddly 
complacent until shortly before the crises, even though there were ample rea- 
sons to think that there was at least some risk of such crises. Principal-agent- 
type stories might be one explanation of this passivity: money managers (or 
internal, subjective money management “modules”) were less concerned about 430  Paul Krugman 
crisis than they should have been because they were acting the same way  as 
everyone else. 
Contagion 
The currency crises of the 1990s have consisted of three regional “waves”: 
the ERM crises in Europe in 1992-93,  the Latin American crises of  1994-95, 
and the Asian crises currently in progress. But why should there be such re- 
gional waves-as  Ronald Reagan said after visiting Latin America, they are 
all different countries, so why should they experience a common crisis? This 
is the issue of “contagion.” 
One simple explanation of  contagion involves real linkages between the 
countries: a currency crisis in country A worsens the fundamentals of country 
B. For example, the Southeast Asian countries currently under speculative at- 
tack are, to at least some extent, selling similar products in world export mar- 
kets; thus a Thai devaluation tends to depress Malaysian exports and could 
push Malaysia past the critical point that triggers a crisis. In the European cri- 
ses of  1992-93, there was an element of competitive devaluation: depreciation 
of the pound adversely affected the trade and employment of France, or at least 
was perceived to do so, and thus increased the pressures on the French govern- 
ment to abandon its own commitment to a fixed exchange rate. 
However, even in the European and Asian cases the trade links appear fairly 
weak; and in the Latin American crisis of 1995 they were virtually nil. Mexico 
is neither an important market nor an important competitor for Argentina; why, 
then, should one peso crisis have triggered another? 
At this point two interesting “rational” explanations for crisis contagion be- 
tween seemingly unlinked economies have been advanced (Drazen 1997). One 
is that countries are perceived as a group with some common but imperfectly 
observed characteristics. To caricature this position, Latin American countries 
share a common culture and therefore, perhaps, a “Latin temperament”; but the 
implications of that temperament for economic policy may be unclear. Once 
investors have seen one country with that cultural background abandon its peg 
under pressure, they may revise downward their estimate of the willingness of 
other such countries to defend their parties. (An observation: In 1982 the Latin 
countries suffered a crisis that, although it mainly involved dollar-denominated 
debt rather than domestic currency, was similar in form and psychology to a 
currency crisis. This crisis quickly spread from Mexico through the whole 
area. The Philippines, however, were at first unaffected, even though both its 
policies and its debt burden were quite as bad as those of Mexico, Argentina, 
and Brazil; it was not until almost a year after the original onset that investors 
seem to have decided that this former Spanish colony was in fact a Latin rather 
than an Asian country and attacked.) 
Alternatively, one may  argue that the political commitment to a fixed ex- 
change rate is itself subject to herding effects. This is perhaps clearest in the 
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costly for Sweden to abandon its peg to the deutsche mark than it would have 
been had Sweden devalued on its own. 
One may also argue, of course, that contagion reflects irrational behavior on 
the part of investors, either because individuals are really irrational or because 
money  managers face asymmetric incentives. South Korea has few strong 
trade links with the troubled economies of Southeast Asia; yet a fund manager 
who did not reduce exposure in South Korea, then was caught in a devaluation 
of the won, might well be blamed for lack of due diligence-after  all, Asian 
currencies have been risky in recent months, haven’t they? 
As in the case of herding in general, there seems to be positive as well as 
negative contagion. During the wave of optimism that followed Mexican and 
Argentine reforms in the early 1990s, countries that had done little actual re- 
form, such as Brazil, were also lifted by the rising tide; and the apparent myo- 
pia of markets about Asian risks seems to have been fed by a general sense of 
optimism about Asian economies in general. 
Market Manipulation 
Scenarios in which crises are generated either by  self-fulfilling rational ex- 
pectations or by  irrational herding behavior imply at least the possibility of 
profitable market manipulation by large speculators. (Krugman 1996 proposed 
that such hypothetical agents be referred to as “Soroi.”) Suppose that a country 
is vulnerable to a run on its currency: either investors believe that it will aban- 
don its currency peg if challenged by a speculative attack, or they simply emu- 
late each other and can therefore be stampeded. Then a large investor could 
engineer profits for himself by first quietly taking a short position in that coun- 
try’s currency, then deliberately triggering a crisis-which  he could do through 
some combination of public statements and ostentatious selling. 
The classic example of this strategy is, of course, George Soros’s attack on 
the British pound in 1992. As argued in the case study below, it is likely that 
the pound would have dropped out of the ERM in any case; but Soros’s actions 
may have triggered an earlier exit than would have happened otherwise. 
In addition to being the classic example of how a market manipulator can 
generate a crisis, however, Soros’s attack on the pound may be the only ex- 
ample in recent years. At any rate, it is hard to come up with any other clear-cut 
examples. This has not, of course, prevented politicians from blaming market 
manipulation in general and Soros in particular for currency crises, even when 
there is no evidence that they have played a role. 
Why are such engineered speculative attacks rare? One answer is that the 
scope for self-fulfilling crises is actually rather limited: most currencies tend 
to get attacked soon after it becomes apparent that they are vulnerable to such 
an attack. As argued earlier, this will happen if a continuing deterioration in the 
fundamentals is predictable: knowing that an  eventual collapse of the exchange 
regime is inevitable, investors will try to anticipate the collapse, thereby bring- 
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can succeed. In Krugman (1996) I also argued that the existence of Soroi itself 
tends to advance the date of  speculative attack: since everyone knows that a 
currency that is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling attack presents a profit opportu- 
nity for large players, investors will sell the currency in anticipation that one 
or another of these players will in fact undermine the exchange regime-and 
in so doing investors will force the collapse of the regime even without the aid 
of a Soros. 
Of course, if currencies spontaneously collapse as soon as a potential profit 
for Soroi appears, this will eliminate the opportunity for Soroi to make profits; 
but if nobody is playing that game, investors will no longer expect collapsible 
currency regimes to be collapsed. This paradox is essentially the same as that 
which arises in the context of  struggles for corporate control: a takeover at- 
tempt will not be profitable if the potential gains are already in the stock price, 
but there will be no gains if  there is no takeover attempt. From a modeling 
point of view this seems to suggest the absence of any equilibrium, unless one 
introduces sufficient “noise” into the story. In practical terms we may  simply 
note that for whatever reason, the success of Soros at making money by pro- 
voking the pound‘s devaluation seems thus far to have been a one-time event. 
8.1.4  Case Study 1: The ERM Crises of 1992-93 
In the fall of 1992 massive capital flows led to the exit of Britain, Italy, and 
Spain from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System. 
(Strictly speaking, they remained within the system itself.) In the summer of 
1993 a second wave  of  attacks led to a decision to widen the exchange rate 
bands of that system, essentially to allow the French franc to depreciate with- 
out any formal exit. In subsequent years events have  unfolded in somewhat 
ironic ways: France, having been given leeway for a somewhat weaker franc, 
chose not to use it, returning to the original narrow band against the mark; 
while the boom in the U.K. economy that followed the exit from the ERM has 
now pushed the pound above the rate at which it originally exited. Still, the 
ERM crises remain one of the classic episodes of speculative attack, and they 
are the most thoroughly studied such episode. 
Part of what makes the ERM crises so classic is that they so clearly demon- 
strate the importance of second-, as opposed to first-, generation models. The 
European countries attacked in 1992 and 1993 did not fit the canonical crisis 
model at all. In all cases, governments retained full access to capital markets, 
both domestic and foreign. This meant, first of all, that they had no need to 
monetize their budget deficits; and indeed they did not have exceptionally rapid 
growth of  domestic credit (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz  1995). It also 
meant that they were not suffering from any ironclad limitation on foreign 
exchange reserves: they remained able to borrow on foreign markets and in- 
deed clearly retained the ability to stabilize their currencies had they so chosen 
simply by raising domestic interest rates sufficiently. Finally, all of the target 
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What, then, provided the motivation for devaluation that we have seen is 
a crucial ingredient for second-generation models? The answer was  clearly 
unemployment due to inadequate demand, and the resulting pressure on mone- 
tary authorities to engage in expansionary policies-policies  that could not be 
pursued as long as the countries remained committed to a fixed exchange 
rate-was  the essential fuel for the crises. Essentially we  can think of Euro- 
pean governments as facing a trade-off between the political costs of  unem- 
ployment over and above its “structural” or “natural” level, on one side, and 
the political costs of dropping out of the EM,  on the other. 
Behind the unemployment problem, in turn, was an unusual situation trig- 
gered by the interaction between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the role of the 
deutsche mark as the de facto key currency of the European Monetary System. 
The heavy expenditures by  Germany on its newly reunited eastern Lander 
amounted to an expansionary fiscal policy for western Germany; the Bundes- 
bank, like the Federal Reserve faced with the deficit spending of  the 1980s, 
responded with a tight monetary policy. However, other European countries 
pegging to the mark found themselves obliged to match the tight monetary 
policy without the fiscal expansion; thus they were pushed into recession. 
All the ingredients for crisis, then, were in place. However, four special as- 
pects of the ERM crises should be noted. First was the role of a large actor- 
George Soros-in  triggering the crisis. Soros had divined early in the game 
the possibility of a sterling devaluation and set about discreetly establishing 
a short position in the form of  a number of  short-term credit lines, totaling 
approximately $15 billion. He was thus in a position to profit from a collapse 
of the exchange regime and did in fact attempt by his own sales to precipitate 
that collapse. It remains unclear, however, how important a role his actions 
actually played; it is arguable that the fundamental reasons for the crisis would 
have set it off even without any action on Soros’s part. A guess might be that 
he advanced the date of the crisis by only a few weeks or months. 
Second, the crisis demonstrated the near irrelevance of  foreign exchange 
reserves in a world of high capital mobility. The central banks of both Britain 
and Italy had substantial reserves and were also entitled under ERM rules to 
credit lines from Germany. Thus they were able to engage in direct foreign ex- 
change intervention on a very large scale-Britain  appears to have  bought 
some $50 billion worth of sterling over the course of a few days. However, this 
intervention was sterilized-that  is, it was offset by open market operations so 
as to avoid reducing the size of the monetary base. And it was clearly ineffec- 
tual. It became clear that sterling could be defended only by a domestic mone- 
tary contraction, and after only two (?) days of higher interest rates the Bank 
of England abandoned the fixed parity. 
Third, retrospectives on the ERM crises turn up a surprising fact: the crises 
seem to have been virtually unanticipated by  the financial markets. Rose and 
Svensson (1  994) show that interest differentials against the target currencies 
did not begin to widen until August 1992-a  month before the breakup. 
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“failed,” and were driven off their pegs, did better by  almost any measure in 
the following period than those that succeeded in defending their currencies. 
The United Kingdom, in particular, experienced a rapid drop in its unemploy- 
ment rate without any corresponding rise in inflation. 
8.1.5  Case Study 2: The Latin Crises, 1994-95 
The Latin crisis of 1994-95 was similar to the ERM crises in some respects, 
quite different in others. Above all, its consequences were much more severe 
for the affected economies. 
Claims that several Latin currencies, in particular the Mexican and Argen- 
tine peso, were overvalued were common among economists as early as the be- 
ginning of  1993 (see, e.g., Dornbusch 1994). These claims were based on one 
or more of three observations: purchasing power parity calculations, which sug- 
gested that costs and prices had gotten out of line with those of trading part- 
ners; large current account deficits; and slow growth (in the case of Mexico) 
or high unemployment (in the case of Argentina), suggesting that there would 
be room for monetary expansion if  only the exchange rate were not a con- 
straint. 
In Latin America, however, as in Europe, these warnings appear to have 
been more or less ignored by  financial markets. Government officials were 
adamant that devaluation was  not under consideration, and the markets be- 
lieved them. Through the whole of  1993 interest premiums on the pesos re- 
mained low, and the current account deficits were easily financed. 
Mexico experienced a deteriorating situation over the course of 1994. Politi- 
cal uncertainty emerged following two unexpected events: the peasant rebel- 
lion in Chiapas and the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candi- 
date. The government also appeared to relax monetary and fiscal discipline in 
the run-up to the presidential election. Foreign capital inflows began to dry up, 
and there was a rapid decline in foreign exchange reserves. A critical point was 
reached when the government found itself unable to roll over the Tesobonos, 
dollar-denominated short-term debt. 
Faced with this external pressure, Mexico decided shortly after the election 
to devalue the peso. However, the devaluation was botched in several respects. 
First, the size of the devaluation, at 15 percent, was widely regarded as inade- 
quate; thus the government had sacrificed the credibility of its commitment to 
a fixed rate without satisfying markets that the devaluation was behind it. Sec- 
ond, by consulting business leaders about the plan, the government in effect 
gave Mexican insiders the opportunity to make profits at the expense of unin- 
formed foreign investors, helping to discredit the policy. Finally, Mexican of- 
ficials managed to convey a sense of both arrogance and incompetence to for- 
eign investors in the days immediately following the devaluation. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the initial small devaluation was followed by  a 
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quickly fell to half  its precrisis value; the resulting spike in  import prices 
caused inflation, which had previously fallen to low single-digit levels, to soar. 
In order to stabilize the peso and the inflation rate, the government was obliged 
to raise domestic interest rates to very high levels, peaking at above 80 percent. 
The high rates in turn led to a sharp contraction in domestic demand, and real 
GDP fell by 7 percent in the year following the crisis. 
Fears that the crisis would undermine Mexico’s political stability led the 
United States to engineer a massive international loan to the Mexican govern- 
ment, hoping to buy a breathing space while confidence was restored. This 
effort was successful: during 1996 economic growth resumed, and Mexico re- 
gained normal access to international capital markets, repaying the emergency 
loan ahead of schedule. 
Argentina had initially hoped that its very different currency regime-a  cur- 
rency board system, with the peso rigidly linked to the dollar at a one-for-one 
parity, and with every peso in the monetary base backed by  a dollar of  re- 
serves-would  protect it from any spillover from the Mexican crisis. In effect, 
Argentina had ensured that it was not vulnerable to the kind of crisis envisaged 
by  the canonical crisis model. Argentina might also have  expected that the 
absence of any strong trade linkage with Mexico would prevent any contagion. 
However, speculators attacked the currency nonetheless, presumably suspect- 
ing that Argentina might abandon the currency board in order to reduce the 
unemployment rate. (We might call this the revenge of the second-generation 
model.) 
Under the currency board system, the capital outflows led to a rapid decline 
in the monetary base. This, in turn, created a crisis in the banking system, 
which contributed to a downturn milder than Mexico’s but still extremely se- 
vere. International official loans, albeit on a smaller scale than Mexico’s, were 
needed to prop up the banking system. 
In contrast to Mexico, Argentina chose to hang tough on its exchange rate 
regime, betting that the financial markets would eventually realize that its com- 
mitment was absolute and that the pressure would ease. And in 1996 Argentina 
also resumed economic growth. 
The Latin crises thus share some common features with the European expe- 
rience but also show some strong differences. The most striking commonality 
was the apparent failure of financial markets to anticipate the crises, or even 
give any weight to the possibility of a crisis, until very late in the game-in 
spite of widely circulated warnings by  economists that such crises might be 
brewing. The most striking difference was in the aftermath of crisis. Suppose 
that one thinks of  Britain and France as representing one matched pair-a 
country that gave in to the pressure and one that did not-while  Mexico and 
Argentina are another. In the first case the devaluing country actually did very 
well postdevaluation (leading to some facetious suggestions that a statue of 
George Soros be erected in Trafalgar Square); the nondevaluing country did 
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countries suffered almost incredibly severe recessions, but the devaluing coun- 
try was worse hit, at least initially. 
8.1.6  Case Study 3: Asian Crises 
The Asian situation is still in flux at the time of writing, information is still 
incomplete, and no careful economic studies are yet available. So this can only 
be a brief and provisional summary. 
During  1995 a number of  economists had begun to wonder whether the 
countries of  Southeast Asia might be vulnerable to a Latin-type crisis. The 
main  objective indicator was the emergence of  very  large current account 
deficits. Closer examination also revealed that several of the countries had de- 
veloped worrying financial weaknesses: heavy investment in highly speculative 
real estate ventures, financed by  borrowing either from poorly informed for- 
eign sources or by credit from underregulated domestic financial institutions. 
It is now  known that during 1996 officials from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank actually began warning the governments of Thai- 
land, Malaysia, and other countries of the risks posed by their financial situa- 
tion and urged corrective policies. However, these warnings were brusquely 
rejected by those governments. 
As in  the  case of  the  other regional currency crises, financial markets 
showed little sign of  concern until very late in the game. The extraordinary 
growth record of the region seems to have convinced many that the usual cau- 
tions did not apply. (One pension fund manager described to me a briefing on 
Indonesian prospects by someone from Moody’s. Some members of the audi- 
ence had expressed worry about the reliability of  the data and the financial 
reports they had seen. His response was that you should think of  it as being 
like a Javanese shadow puppet show-you  couldn’t actually see the puppets, 
but you could see their shadows, and that told the story.) 
The slide toward crisis began with an export slowdown in the region, partly 
due to the appreciation of  the dollar (to which  the target currencies were 
pegged) against the yen, partly to specific developments in key  industries, 
partly to growing competition from China. With export growth flagging, the 
overbuilding of real estate-especially  in Thailand-became  all too apparent. 
In turn, dropping real estate prices pulled down stock prices and placed the 
solvency of financial institutions in question. 
Up to this point, the developments were mainly a domestic financial crisis, 
similar in general outline to the bursting of Japan’s “bubble economy” in the 
early 1990s. During the first half of 1997, however, speculators finally began to 
wonder whether the financial distress of Southeast Asian countries, especially 
Thailand, might provoke them to devalue in the hope of reflating the economy. 
The growing suspicion that such a move might be in prospect, despite govern- 
ment insistence that it was not, led to widening interest premiums; these in 
turn increased the pressure, both by adding deflationary impetus and by  creat- 
ing cash flow problems for financially stressed businesses. 437  Currency Crises 
On 2 July Thailand gave in to the pressures and floated the baht; as in the 
other crises, this led to speculation against other regional currencies and was 
followed shortly by  somewhat smaller devaluations in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines. The wave of devaluations, and the troubled financial pic- 
ture revealed by the crisis, shook investor confidence; in an effort to regain that 
confidence, all of  the countries involved have  imposed new fiscal austerity. 
Thailand received an emergency loan from the IMF; part of the conditionality 
was a cleanup of its financial system. 
At this point the real consequences of the crisis are still to be revealed. There 
seems to be general agreement that Thailand, like Mexico, will suffer an initial 
blow to its growth. ’Ifrpical estimates are that it will go from the 9 percent av- 
erage rates of recent years to roughly zero growth over the next year. The im- 
pact on neighboring economies is a subject of considerable dispute, with the IMF 
predicting only a small impact while many private economists predict much 
more severe slowdowns. 
At  this point it remains unclear how far the contagion will spread. South 
Korea is the most interesting case: it has severe internal financial problems and 
a massive current account deficit, but it has few real linkages to the Southeast 
Asian economies. At the time of writing there does not seem to have been any 
pressure on China, even though the giant nation is reported to have massive 
quantities of bad internal debt. 
An  interesting counterpoint to the Latin experience is provided by  Hong 
Kong, which like Argentina has a currency board and is pegged to the U.S. 
dollar (and intends to remain that way, even though it is politically now part of 
China). After a brief probing, financial markets seem to have decided that the 
Hong Kong dollar is not at risk, and what is now the Special Administrative 
Region thus seems to have insulated itself from the crisis. 
The most peculiar aspect of the Asian crisis has been the reaction of some 
of the region’s leaders. Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir bin Mohamed, has 
taken the lead, blaming the crisis on the conspiratorial activities of  George 
Soros (whom he has described as a “moron”), prompted by U.S.  government 
officials. Unless new evidence surfaces, this claim is even odder than it sounds: 
as far as market participants are aware, Soros was not even a player in this crisis 
and indeed seems to have guessed wrong, buying Malaysian ringgit. Mahathir 
temporarily imposed limits on stock trading intended to stop the alleged con- 
spiracy and has made public calls for an end to currency trading that have 
made financial markets understandably nervous that he might try to impose 
capital controls. 
8.1.7  Macroeconomic Questions 
Although the currency crises of the 1990s have inspired a good deal of re- 
search, one area remains neglected. What are the macroeconomic impacts of 
crisis, and why in particular have they differed so much between episodes? 
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clearly that crises in the 1990s are best described by  second-generation mod- 
els-that  is, the motives for devaluation lie in the perceived need for more ex- 
pansionary monetary policies rather than in budget deficits and inflation. One 
might therefore suppose that when a country gives in to temptation it would 
receive a reward-that  whatever the cost in political capital or long-term infla- 
tion credibility, there would at least be a payoff in terms of short-run economic 
expansion. And this was exactly what happened in the European crises; indeed, 
those countries that abandoned their principles seem to have gone completely 
unpunished. 
In the Latin crisis, however, and at least as far as we can tell in the Asian 
crises, the decision to devalue seems to have led to serious adverse short-run 
consequences on all fronts. Instead of  permitting reflation, the devaluations 
seem to have led to even more severe contraction. Why? And why has the 
experience been so different? 
Systematic attempts to answer these questions are still lacking (although 
papers prepared for the NBER’s conference on currency crises may  supply 
some answers). A quick conjecture is that the key difference was how well in- 
formed markets were about the policy environment in the respective sets of 
countries.  A British devaluation,  while it may have shattered the credibility  of the 
current chancellor of the exchequer, did not shake confidence in British institu- 
tions in general; markets still had full confidence that the government of  the 
United Kingdom would continue to allow free markets to function, that it would 
honor its debts, that the Bank of England would continue to worry about infla- 
tion, and so on. Thus, once the pound had depreciated substantially, markets 
were prepared to believe that investment in Britain was actually a good bet. 
In Mexico, by  contrast, the devaluation made markets question the whole 
premise that the country was now run by reliable, reformist technocrats. As the 
crisis deepened, so did concerns that a backlash against the reformers would 
lead to a return to dirigiste policies-and  these concerns, by promoting further 
capital flight, deepened the crisis. One might summarize Mexico’s situation in 
1995 as one in which the country had to offer very high interest rates to offset 
the nervousness of investors about the country’s  political future-and  in which 
that nervousness was largely the result of concern about the political damage 
inflicted by high interest rates. The rescue package organized by  the United 
States may be seen as an attempt to break this vicious circle. 
The Asian crisis, like that in Latin America, seems to have  shaken basic 
confidence in the countries much more than the crisis in Europe. Investors are 
now emphasizing weaknesses in the political and institutional environment- 
lax bank regulation, widespread corruption, grandiose policies-that  were ob- 
vious even to casual observers before this year but that were brushed off as 
minor blemishes on the Asian miracle until that miracle hit a speed bump. 
At this point, however, this is merely loose speculation. More careful analy- 
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8.1.8  Can Currency Crises Be Prevented? 
A world in which major currency crises occur at an average rate of one every 
nineteen months is not a very comfortable one for economic policymakers. 
What, if anything, can be done to prevent them, or at least to keep them from 
happening so often? 
One possibility would be to return to the world of the early 196Os, an era in 
which extensive capital controls prevented the massive flows of hot money that 
now drive crises. Something like this seems to be what Mahathir is proposing, 
but nothing along these lines seems likely in the near future. 
Another possibility would simply be for countries to follow sound and con- 
sistent policies, so that they are not attacked by speculators. There is a lot to 
be said for this; many crises do seem to be the result of obvious inconsistencies 
between the domestic policies of a country and its exchange regime. However, 
the main point of  second-generation models may be stated this way: the real 
cause of  currency crises is not so much what you are actually doing, as what 
the financial markets suspect you might want to do. Britain’s monetary policy 
as a member of the ERM was impeccably correct; but Soros and others cor- 
rectly suspected that when push came to shove the government would choose 
employment over the exchange rate. In order to have prevented such an attack, 
the British government would have had to change not its policies but its prefer- 
ences. 
This point also explains why institutional arrangements like currency boards 
do not offer secure protection against speculative attack. A currency fully 
backed by reserves means that one cannot be mechanically forced to devalue; 
but it does nothing to prevent you from choosing to devalue, even if you have 
insisted that you will not and have up until now pursued policies consistent 
with a fixed rate. 
Incidentally, these considerations have considerable bearing on European 
prospects. It now appears very likely that a core group of European countries 
will formally enter European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at the 
beginning of  1999, and they may well lock the parities as early as May  1998. 
However, actual euro notes will not replace national currencies for several 
years. As a growing number of commentators have noticed, this means that it 
will still be technically quite possible for a country to drop out of EMU during 
this interim period-which  means that currency crises are quite possible after 
EMU supposedly has gone into effect. 
How  can a country ensure that it will not give in to speculative attack? It 
can attempt to raise the stakes, by placing the prestige of the government on 
the line; it can sign solemn treaties; and so on. The only surefire way  not to 
have one’s currency speculated against, however, is not to have an independent 
currency. True monetary union is one answer to the problem of currency crisis. 
The other answer is simply not to offer speculators an easy target, by refus- 
ing to defend any particular exchange rate in the first place. Once a country 440  Paul Krugman 
has a floating exchange rate, any speculative concerns about its future policies 
will already be reflected in the exchange rate. Thus anyone betting against the 
currency will face a real risk, rather than the one-way option in speculating 
against a fixed rate. 
Reasoning along these lines has convinced a number of economists working 
on currency crises that the ultimate lesson of  the crisis-ridden  1990s is that 
countries should avoid halfway houses. They should either float their currenc- 
ies or join currency unions. It remains to be seen whether this stark recommen- 
dation will survive closer scrutiny. 
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2. Kenneth Rogoff 
Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility 
8.2.1  Introduction 
Will the introduction of the euro mark the beginning of the end of the mod- 
em floating exchange rate era? After nearly a quarter-century of volatile major- 
currency exchange rates, do we think we now understand exchange rate fluc- 
tuations and know how to deal with them? This paper offers a rather sober 
view of what economists know-and  do not know-about  the causes and con- 
sequences of exchange market volatility. 
8.2.2  The Nagging Persistence of Exchange Rate Volatility 
During the macroeconomic chaos of  the  197Os, the popular perception 
among economists was that if  governments could only manage to whip infla- 
tion, calm in foreign exchange markets would surely follow. In the meantime, 
the only advice economists could give for dealing with exchange rate volatility 
was to run for cover. The 1970s view laid the blame for unstable exchange 
rates squarely at the doorstep of the monetary authorities. If officials’ plans for 
monetary policy were hard to predict-and  during the 1970s, they were hard 
to predict-then  there was no way  of  ruling out sustained large divergences 
in countries’ price levels.’ Even a very loose interpretation of the doctrine of 
“purchasing power parity” suggests that price level instability is incompatible 
with exchange rate stability. 
The theoretical case against the hapless monetary authorities was greatly 
strengthened  by Rudiger Dornbusch’s (1976)  celebrated “overshooting”  model. 
By  introducing forward-looking “rational” expectations into the canonical 
Keynesian model of  open economy macroeconomics (due to Mundell and 
Fleming), Dornbusch showed that monetary policy shifts can easily lead to 
disproportionately large movements in exchange rates. Under certain plausible 
assumptions, the sluggishness of wages and prices means that the exchange 
rate must bear a disproportionate burden of the adjustment to monetary shocks, 
at least in the short run.  Ergo, a little monetary instability can lead to a lot of 
exchange rate instability; a lot of monetary instability can lead to near chaos- 
pretty much the situation in the 1970s, at least in comparison with the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
The theory seemed to fit the facts, and it was intrinsically very elegant to 
boot (a big selling point in any science). Unfortunately today, as inflation con- 
1. Obviously, money demand instability also became much more severe in the 1970s,  though in 
principle such instability can be offset by adjustments in the money supply. 442  Kenneth Rogoff 
tinues to subside, it is becoming increasingly clear that monetary instability is 
at most a piece of the exchange rate volatility puzzle. It certainly cannot carry 
the full burden-or  the blame-attributed  to it by  monetary models of  the 
1970s (or 1980s, for that matter). Consumer price index (CPI) inflation across 
Europe, the United States, and Japan has fallen drastically over the past twenty 
years, converging toward the 1 to 2 percent range. (Taking into account the 
much-ballyhooed upward bias in the CPI, “true” cost-of-living inflation is pro- 
bably only 0 to 1 percent.) Moreover, market concern over the possibility of a 
relapse into high inflation continues to recede as improvements in monetary 
institutions-especially  greater de jure and de facto central bank indepen- 
dence-strengthen  the  hand  of  anti-inflation conservative elements within 
governments. 
Yet despite the drop in inflation, exchange rates across the big three curren- 
cies (the dollar, the euro, and the yen) are still remarkably volatile. Can concern 
over long-run divergences in inflation rates possibly explain why, between the 
spring of  1995 and May  1997, the dollar appreciated by roughly 60 percent 
against the yen and 30 percent against the mark? Indeed by comparison with 
some of the larger monthly swings in the major currency cross-rates, the mid- 
August 1997 devaluations in Asia (ranging from 17 to 34 percent cumulated 
through mid-September) do not seem quite so horrific. One may well ask, has 
the conquest of inflation brought any drop at all in major-currency exchange 
rate volatility? 
Figure 8.1 asks just this question for the yen-dollar, mark-dollar, and trade- 
weighted dollar exchange rates. The figure divides the floating rate period 
1975-98  into three-year intervals and looks the volatility of month-to-month 
changes in the exchange rate within each period.* Interestingly, the standard 
deviation of month-to-month changes in the trade-weighted dollar (filled  dia- 
monds) has indeed been steadily dropping since the late 1980s, from a high of 
2.7 percent per month during 1987-89  to 1.6 percent over the most recent pe- 
riod. 
The bilateral dollar rates against the deutsche mark and yen  are generally 
much more volatile, each averaging 3.3 percent per month over the entire pe- 
riod versus 2.1 percent for the trade-weighted dollar. As the graph shows, vola- 
tility of the mark-dollar (now euro-dollar) rate has been falling, though not as 
dramatically as for the trade-weighted dollar. The volatility of the yen-dollar 
rate has barely fallen at all, remaining almost 3.0 percent per month. 
Figure 8.2 also provides a different perspective, comparing the evolution in 
volatility of the trade-weighted dollar with that of the trade-weighted yen and 
deutsche mark. Not surprisingly, the volatility of  the trade-weighted mark is 
far lower than that of the dollar, with the standard deviation averaging only 1.2 
2. The standard deviations in figs. 8.1 and 8.2 are calculated as [E (Ae,)z/n]’n,  where At?, is the 
month-to-month change in the log exchange rate and n is the number of observations. Note that 
we are implicitly assuming that the exchange rate follows a random walk. As we discuss below, 
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percent over the entire period, dropping to 0.8 percent in the 1996-98  subper- 
iod. The low volatility of  the trade-weighted mark is not surprising; a large 
part of Germany’s trade is with other countries in the former European Mone- 
tary  System (EMS). Even counting occasional realignments, cross-country 
EMS exchange rates were relatively stable even before the advent of the euro. 
The trade-weighted yen has been much more unstable in recent years than 
the dollar or the deutsche mark (euro), and its volatility has even risen slightly 
since the mid-1980s. Partly this is due to the fact that many of Japan’s Asian 
trading partners peg to the dollar rather than the yen; the fact that Japan’s eco- 
nomic growth has been out of  synch with the United States and Europe is 
probably also a factor. 
Finally, to put the exchange rate numbers in perspective, figure 8.2 includes 
a measure of the volatility of the S&P 500 stock index. As one can see, stock 
price changes, with a standard deviation of 4.1 percent over the entire period, 
are generally even more volatile than exchange rates (including even the bilat- 
eral rates in fig. 8.1).3 
Thus, overall, exchange rate volatility has indeed fallen somewhat in recent 
years. Whether one can attribute this decline to the general fall in inflation, or 
to the switch in central bank operating procedures toward greater emphasis on 
smoothing fluctuations in very short-term interest rates, is unclear. But what is 
clear is that despite great successes in the battle against inflation, exchange rate 
volatility across the major currencies is still quite significant. 
8.2.3  Explaining Exchange Rate Fluctuations (or Not) 
In retrospect, economists should have realized that the elegant theories of 
the 1970s overstated the important of monetary factors-and  ergo the role of 
central banks-in  causing exchange rate volatility. Ever since the early 1980s, 
well before low inflation had settled in, a steady stream of negative empirical 
results began to cast doubt on monetary instability and overshooting as the key 
elements of exchange rate volatility. Researchers have long been finding that 
standard monetary models, even when they appear to fit the data well within a 
given sample period, tend to perform poorly in out-of-sample te~ting.~ 
The extent to which monetary models (or, indeed, any existing structural 
models of exchange rates) fail to explain even medium-term volatility is diffi- 
cult to overstate. The out-of-sample forecasting performance of the models is 
so mediocre that at horizons of one month to two years they fail to outperform 
a naive random walk model (which says that the best forecast of  any future 
exchange rate is today’s rate). Almost incredibly, this result holds even when 
the model forecasts are based on actual realized values of the explanatory vari- 
ables. 
3. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chap. 9) also made this point. 
4.  This result was demonstrated for various major currency exchange rates in Meese and Rogoff 
(1983a, 1983b) and has since survived extensive empirical testing. For an excellent survey of  the 
literature, see Frankel and Rose (1995). 445  Currency Crises 
What does this mean, exactly? Examples of explanatory variables in struc- 
tural exchange rate equations are countries’ relative output growth, interest 
rates, and money supplies. Obviously, if these variables are extremely hard to 
predict (say because one or both countries have highly erratic monetary pol- 
icy), then of course it will be difficult to predict exchange rates one year hence. 
Prediction will be difficult no matter how well a model can explain exchange 
rate changes after the fact. But the inability of models to forecast exchange 
rates runs deeper than that. It turns out that even if one gives models the (seem- 
ingly  prohibitive) advantage of  forecasting with  actual realized  (one year 
hence) values of outputs, interest rates, and the like, they still fail to outperform 
the naive random walk model. True, this extreme result breaks down at very 
long horizons, over two years (see Meese and Rogoff 1983b; Mark 1995), but 
again even this success relies on using out-of-sample information about the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, it is by no means established that monetary 
models can forecast exchange rates in any meaningful way. 
The skeptical reader might react to the negative forecasting results we have 
been discussing by  saying to himself or herself  “Well, surely a market-based 
variable such as the forward exchange consistently outpredicts the naive ran- 
dom walk model.” Nothing could be farther from the truth. Indeed, as Lewis 
(1995) noted, hundreds of  studies have consistently found that, if  anything, 
forward exchange rates tend to point in the wrong direction! More precisely, 
in regressions of  the actual realized change in the spot rate on the “forward 
premium” (the difference between today’s forward rate and today’s spot rate), 
one tends to find a negative correlation! A literal interpretation of this result 
says one can use the three-month forward rate to predict the spot rate three 
months hence. But (ignoring risk), the money-making strategy involves betting 
against the forward rate. The results in table 8.1 for the dollar-yen and dollar- 
mark thirty-day forward rates are representative of the kind of results one finds 
in this literature. 
If  the forward rate were truly an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, 
one would expect to find coefficient PI  on the forward premium near one (on 
average if  the forward rate is 4 percent above today’s spot rate, the realized 
exchange rate will be 4  percent above as well.) Instead, the coefficient PI is 
Table 8.1  Forward Premium ble 
Exchange Rate  P”  P, 
Dollar-  yen  .005  -2.62 
(1.01) 
Dollar-mark  -.Do1  -.64 
(.W3)  (1.15) 
Data Source: Datastream International. 
Note: Representative regressions for the dollar-yen and dollar-mark exchange rates; nonoverlap- 
ping monthly data, 19892-97:9. Equation is e,,, -  e, = Po + P,(f, -  e,) + E,+,, where e,  is the 
log of the time t spot rate andf; is the log of the thirty-day forward rate. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 446  Kenneth Rogoff 
actually negative. (Here it is not significantly less than zero for the dollar-mark 
rate, but in larger samples, it often is.) 
Of course, there is no theoretical quandary here, since the forward rate incor- 
porates a risk premium, and it is perfectly possible that on average, the risk 
premium tends to outweigh the trend change in exchange rates (and tends to 
be negatively correlated with it). It  is also quite likely that there is a “peso 
problem” in the data-the  floating rate period is still very young, and markets 
incorporate expectations of unlikely events (say a significant global conflagra- 
tion) that (happily) have not been witnessed in the sample (see Rogoff  1980; 
Lewis 1992). These expectations appear to impart a bias in the forward rate 
that would disappear in a sufficiently large sample. Overall, though, a reason- 
able interpretation of results is that there is simply no evidence that the forward 
rate outperforms the random walk model. 
Lest we leave the reader with an image of  total darkness in the realm of 
exchange rate forecasting, one should mention a couple of bright spots. First, 
there is an increasing consensus across a broad number of studies that purchas- 
ing power parity (PPP) considerations do matter for long-run exchange rate 
determination (see Froot and Rogoff 1995; Rogoff  1996). (The most widely 
tested form of  PPP test posits that over long periods, changes in exchange 
rates reflect cumulative inflation differentials.) The half-life of PPP deviations, 
however, appears to be extremely long, on the order of  three to four years. 
That is, if a 10 percent appreciation of  the nominal yen-dollar rate leads to a 
corresponding change in the real (CPI-adjusted) yen-dollar rate, then, on aver- 
age, roughly 5 percent of  the shock will have dissipated after four years. This, 
of course, does not tell us what happens to the nominal exchange rate because 
part or all of the adjustment can take place through relative price movements 
rather than the exchange rate. But at least it is evidence that there is some an- 
chor out there for exchange rates. 
Second, newer theoretical models emphasizing nonmonetary factors have 
increasingly come to supplant the classic Keynesian framework of  Mundell, 
Fleming, and Dornbusch. These “new open economy macroeconomics” mod- 
els emphasize other factors in addition to money, including government spend- 
ing and productivity shocks. Whereas it is extremely unlikely that even these 
newer models will be able to explain very short term fluctuations in exchange 
rates, early evidence suggests that the other factors they emphasize may be at 
least as important as monetary factors in medium- to long-run exchange rate 
determination (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, chaps. 4 and lo). 
Overall, the empirical evidence on exchange rates overwhelmingly supports 
the view that simply making monetary policy more stable and predictable can 
only go part way toward quelling exchange rate volatility. The steady deregula- 
tion of global capital markets since the 1960s and the stunning pace of innova- 
tion in global finance make stabilizing exchange rates a much more complex 
problem that it was in the halcyon days of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
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8.2.4  What Are the Costs of Exchange Rate Volatility? 
Though simply bringing down inflation is not enough, it is possible in prin- 
ciple to stabilize the yen-dollar and mark-dollar exchange rates should global 
monetary authorities attach a sufficiently high weight to that objective. For 
example, the United States and Japan could in principle slavishly peg their cur- 
rencies to the euro. Other mechanisms for fixing exchange rates might allocate 
the right to steer global monetary policy more evenly, but as the European 
experience has shown us, the coordination problems involved in such a system 
can be quite severe, absent political integration. I will return to these issues in 
the final section of this paper. 
Here I want to tackle a different question. How serious are the costs of ex- 
change rate volatility, and how great would the gains be to removing it? At a 
casual level, it would seem that the costs of exchange rate volatility are rather 
obvious. Exchange rate volatility presents significant problems for exporters 
and  importers, not  to  mention  any  company  considering building a  plant 
abroad. At a mundane level, the estimated cost of a two-week trip to Europe 
can easily rise or fall 10 percent between the time one embarks and the time 
one returns. But  if  society is to  devote significant resources to  squeezing 
major-currency exchange rate volatility out of the system, it would be nice to 
have a more quantitative feel for the benefits, rather than simply relying on 
casual empiricism. Is it a wrench in the works of  global trade (a perspective 
one often hears from Europe), or is it merely a relatively minor irritant? 
An obvious point to make is that the ability of firms and individuals to hedge 
against exchange rate risk places an upper bound on the size of the costs. Hedg- 
ing may be expensive, but not infinitely so, especially as international capital 
markets deepen and opportunities for portfolio diversification multiply. Even 
without hedging exchange risk through financial instruments, a company may 
still be able to mitigate the effects of exchange rate volatility by simply shifting 
its purchases and sales in response to price signals. The same is true at the 
individual level; when the costs of German cars rise due to an appreciation of 
the euro, Americans can shift demand toward domestic and Japanese models. 
Demand for international travel is similarly quite price elastic. There is no 
question that more Europeans come to visit New York when the dollar is weak. 
Thus the ability of individuals and companies to shift demand across time and 
goods tempers the costs of volatility. 
However, there is an important sense in which the above discussion misses 
a fundamental point. Even with perfect forward markets-in  all things, not 
just exchange rates-there  is no way for the world as a whole to hedge against 
global risks. For this reason, much of literature on risk premiums in forward ex- 
change markets-or  in stocks and bonds, for that matter-neglects  the in- 
conveniences of the trading of individual risk and focuses on the equilibrium 
costs of global risks. Generally speaking, though, this line of reasoning leads 
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all that large, since global output is simply not all that volatile. For example, 
the standard deviation of postwar U.S. consumption has averaged under 3 per- 
cent per year.  Even if  this risk cannot be diversified away,  it is not easy to 
construct models where the welfare effects are large.5  (This same logic under- 
lies the so-called equity premium puzzle. How can stocks offer such a consis- 
tently high rate of return relative to bonds if the risks to aggregate output are 
so low?) 
Thus the benefits of eliminating exchange rate volatility must lie elsewhere, 
since the benefits of reducing consumption volatility (and consumption is pre- 
sumably the ultimate welfare objective) are not likely to be very large even if 
exchange rates truly are a major cause. Of course, all of this discussion is pred- 
icated on the assumption that markets are very complete and global volatility 
is what matters. This view is too extreme, even if it is true that global capi- 
tal market innovation is constantly reducing the costs of diversification. Still, 
these kinds of  considerations should cause one to question just how great an 
evil exchange rate volatility can be. 
Empirical evidence comparisons on the volatility of output and trade under 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates tend to underscore the difficulty of  de- 
tecting the real effects of exchange rate volatility. It is true that if  one looks 
across a broad spectrum of  postwar experiences with fixed and flexible ex- 
change rates, real rates are far more volatile under floating.6  The reason is that 
domestic CPIs tend to fluctuate far less than nominal exchange rates. Thus if 
the nominal exchange rate is fixed, fluctuations in the real exchange rate are 
inevitably going to be much less. One can try to explain away this fact by 
arguing that flexible rates tend to be adopted precisely in situations where real 
shocks are more volatile (indeed, this is precisely the prescription of the classic 
Mundell-Fleming model). But a careful look at the historical circumstances 
under which shifts between fixed and floating rates have taken place shows that 
this argument is quite weak. Real exchange volatility tends to rise precipitously 
within weeks, if not hours, of when a country shifts to flexible rates. Whereas 
it is possible that there has been reverse causality in some circumstances, the 
finding that real exchange rates become more volatile after floating is universal. 
Surely, the relative rigidity of price levels is the main explanation, not the endo- 
geneity of exchange rate regimes. (The relative inflexibility of prices compared 
to exchange rates remains even when one looks at very disaggregated price 
data, and even when one looks at goods that one would typically regard as 
highly traded.)’ 
So floating indeed makes real exchange rates more volatile. The open ques- 
tion, however, is whether real exchange rate volatility has an  effect on any 
5. This point was first raised by Lucas (1988); for a discussion, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, 
6.  This point is made very forcefully by  Mussa (1986). 
7. Again, for a survey, see Rogoff (1996). 
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other macroeconomic variables. Are trade flows greater under fixed rates than 
flexible rates? Is output, consumption, or investment more volatile? The small 
number of  studies that have looked at this question tend to find that the ex- 
change rate regime has little or no influence on volatility of macroaggregates 
(see Baxter and Stockman 1989; Flood and Rose 1995).  Admittedly, the evi- 
dence is far less conclusive or systematic than the evidence on real exchange 
rate variability. But at the very least, it appears that differences do not (or at 
least have not yet) jumped out of the data. 
A third reason why exchange rate volatility may not be all that problematic 
comes out of  recent efforts to provide microfoundations for the classic ex- 
change rate theories of the 1970s (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, chap. 10). 
This new research suggests that while exchange rate volatility may have  ad- 
verse effects, they are not necessarily first order. If the major distortions in the 
economy include factors such as labor market distortions, tax distortions, and 
monopoly distortions, then the welfare effects of  exchange rate movements 
depend to a large extent on whether they exacerbate or ameliorate these distor- 
tions. At the moment, the empirics of this question are not resolved. 
In sum, the costs of exchange rate volatility are not firmly established, and 
the weight of recent research points to the possibility that they are distinctly 
smaller than one might have thought previously. We  have  already seen that 
stock markets are more volatile than exchange rates. But should one consider 
stock market volatility a profound macroeconomic problem? Certainly, some 
regional economies are dramatically affected by  big swings in the S&P 500. 
Wall Street plays a big role in New York City’s economy, and the earnings due 
to the stock market boom are an important factor in the city’s recent rising 
fortunes (just as the bust of the late 1980s made it temporarily much easier to 
find New York taxicabs in the rain). Overall, though, squelching stock market 
volatility is not seen as a pressing national priority that should dominate all 
macroeconomic decisions (as Europe has chosen to make the goal of achieving 
intra-EMS exchange rate stability). 
8.2.5  What Can Be Done about Yen-Dollar-Euro 
Exchange Rate Volatility? 
One can put a different spin on the embarrassing difficulty researchers have 
in showing that macroeconomic performance is significantly affected by  the 
exchange rate regime. Flood and Rose (1995) have argued that if  there is no 
obvious macroeconomic cost in shifting to fixed rates, and if there might be 
gains at the microeconomic level (albeit hard to measure), then why not prefer 
fixed rates? One answer, of  course, is that a sustained exchange rate peg may 
not even be feasible. Over the past decade, speculators have targeted and over- 
run one fixed rate regime after another, so that today, by any measure, there are 
very few long-standing (more than ten years) fixed rate regimes. According to 450  Kenneth Rogoff 
Table 8.2  Foreign Exchange Reserves and the Monetary Base, September 1994 
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the Bank for International Settlements, the daily  flow  through  foreign ex- 
change markets is $1.2 trillion per day (It0 and Folkerts-Landau 1996), far in 
excess of the combined reserve holdings (including gold) of any central bank.8 
If  speculators are determined to attack an individual country’s currency, what 
chance can it have to defend? 
Actually, from a technical perspective, most countries have more than ade- 
quate reserves (even without borrowing) to defend their currencies against at- 
tack, should they be determined to do so. Table 8.2, for example, shows that 
all of the European countries whose exchange rates fell to attacks in 1992-93 
had sufficient reserves to buy back most if not all their outstanding currency 
s~pplies.~ 
But the reason exchange rate attacks can still succeed, even where the cen- 
tral bank has more than adequate reserves, is that governments are often ex- 
tremely reluctant to raise interest rates to the extent necessary to fend off a 
major sustained attack. In practice, central banks tend to rely on massive steri- 
lized intervention rather than sharp reductions in the monetary base to fend off 
exchange rate attacks. The idea is to placate speculators by  altering the cur- 
8. The exchange market flows certainly include some double counting, but on the other hand, 
so too do gross measures of global foreign exchange reserves (since Japanese holdings of US. 
TreasuIy bills are obviously a debt for the United States). 
9. Table 8.2 does not include central bank forward positions, which if large can complicate the 
analysis of  reserve adequacy. Though forward contracts do not involve any capital outlay, capital 
gains and losses suffered on forward contracts lower effective reserves. (The Bank of England is 
rumored to have lost more than $7 billion dollars this way within a matter of a few hours during 
the attack on the pound in 1992.) 451  Currency Crises 
rency denomination of bond supplies held by the public, an operation that has 
very little effect on interest rates. While such intervention may or may not be 
effective at influencing exchange rates during “normal times” (see chap. 3.2 
by  Kathryn Dominguez), during crises, the effects tend to be far too small to 
fend off speculators. 
What of the example of Europe, which by any measure has achieved a sig- 
nificant level of stability in intra-European rates? Can the EMS serve as a blue- 
print for the United States, Europe, and Japan? Not in the near term. Even with 
the high degree of political harmonization in Europe, it is not clear that EMS 
exchange rates would have stabilized in the mid-1990s if officials had not con- 
tinued taking dramatic steps toward the ultimate goal of a single currency. It 
seems highly unlikely that such stubbornly independent regions as Europe, the 
United States, and Japan would presently be capable of  agreeing on a world 
monetary policy, or that any two or three would be willing to adopt the mone- 
tary policy of the third. Of course, if all three regions were willing to perma- 
nently relinquish their right to engage in countercyclical monetary policy, and 
all agreed on targeting zero inflation, the difficulties in coordination would be 
much less. But even if the (developed) world is an optimal currency area in the 
sense of Mundell(1961), this does not mean that these countries have the polit- 
ical desire to place nearly as much emphasis on exchange rate stability as the 
countries of Europe have. The European experience clearly demonstrates that 
political will is at least as important as any other factor. 
What  about  capital  levies on exchange market  transactions?  Could  such 
taxes, if universally implemented, put “sand in the wheels” of exchange mar- 
kets as Tobin (1978) advocated? Perhaps, and some recent writers have advo- 
cated taking this idea seriously (see, e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz  1993). 
But there are reasons to be profoundly skeptical. First of all, as Kenen (1996) 
convincingly showed, the practical problems in implementing a Tobin tax are 
enormous, and problems  of evasion would be rampant. And Kenen did not 
even consider how such laws would create an attractive opportunity for orga- 
nized crime. The potential costs in terms of microeconomic inefficiency are 
likely to be considerable,  even if difficult to measure. Deep, liquid markets 
have been  essential  to many  of  the financial innovations witnessed  by  the 
United States in recent years. These financial innovations have had many spill- 
overs, from making mortgage markets for individuals more liquid to facilitat- 
ing the corporate restructuring that took place in the United States during the 
1980s. Capital market levies would greatly reduce market liquidity and slow 
the rate of financial innovation throughout the world. It is possible that some 
smaller economies might benefit from market-based capital levies to help miti- 
gate the notorious “capital inflows” problem. But even this is highly debatable. 
For the United States, Japan, and Europe, it seems likely that the costs of capi- 
tal market levies would exceed any potential benefits, even if  as a practical 
matter they did succeed in reducing exchange rate volatility. 452  Kenneth Rogoff 
8.2.6  Conclusions 
Central banks have been remarkably successful in subduing inflation in re- 
cent years, but the level of exchange rate volatility among the big three currenc- 
ies (dollar, euro, and yen) has subsided only slightly. Aside from having some 
vague idea that financial market shifts are the major culprit behind exchange 
rate volatility, economists’ understanding  of the empirical sources of  short- 
term exchange rate volatility is still quite limited. The old idea of purchasing 
power parity has some force, but only over very long horizons. 
At the same time economists are having trouble explaining exchange rate 
volatility, they are also having difficulty in explaining exactly why it should 
have profound effects on welfare. Macroeconomic performance is not conspic- 
uously different under fixed versus flexible rates. Nor is it obvious that elim- 
inating exchange rate volatility would have much effect on the volatility of 
aggregate consumption. So our main conclusion is that exchange market vola- 
tility is clearly a nuisance but not necessarily one worth making the focus of 
international macroeconomic policy. 
The view expressed here clearly contrasts with that of mainstream Europe, 
in which fixed exchange rates have taken on a near religious significance and 
are thought to be able to cure all evils from unemployment to arthritis. I would 
argue that European integration has likely been a success in spite of the move 
to one money, rather than because of it. 
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3. Stanley Fischer 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to try to think through some of the issues 
with which the Asian crisis has confronted us. I had prepared a systematic 
presentation, which would have been similar to Andrew Crockett’s (chap. 7.3), 
though no doubt not as persuasive. However, rather than repeat much of what 
Crockett said, I will comment on a series of topics that have come up during 
the conference. 
Crises That Don’t Happen 
The natural tendency to focus on crises that have happened may  lead to 
certain biases. Almost by definition, these are outliers, outcomes that are worse 
These remarks have not been updated to reflect developments since the conference. The author’s 
views on exchange rate systems have evolved since then. Opinions expressed are those of  the 
author, not necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund. 454  Stanley Fischer 
than  anticipated. We  should also think for a minute  about crises that don’t 
happen. 
First, crises don’t  happen in most countries, most of  the time. Second, in 
some cases, they don’t happen because countries have taken action to avoid 
crises that were coming. For example, Hungary in  1995 was heading for a 
serious foreign exchange crisis, a debt crisis. They took decisive action and 
averted the crisis. Arminio Fraga has said that Brazil has been keeping ahead 
of the curve, rather than falling behind. They have been, though more decisive 
fiscal action would be useful. Another example is Israel in 1996, and this year: 
they could have been heading for a crisis with a very large current account 
deficit but took both fiscal and exchange rate action that has removed the risk 
of  a crisis in the next few years. Third, there are crises that are expected but 
don’t happen. I must confess that there are a couple of crises I’ve seen coming 
for two years that haven’t happened yet, and I can’t tell you what they are or 
why I expected them-and  still expect some of them. In thinking about crises, 
we will need to figure out how and why the markets keep financing these coun- 
tries, possibly long enough for them to avoid a crisis. 
Should the Official Sector Speak Out? 
We keep being asked whether  we shouldn’t go public with our concerns 
when we have them. The Thai case is interesting, in part because this crisis 
was foreseen. We warned Thai officials of the difficulties they were likely to 
face, starting in 1996, and with greater force in 1997. 
They didn’t accept our advice. Why? Because they had a weak government 
that was not capable of  taking action short of a crisis. Possibly, also, they did 
not believe us. Perhaps we have a tendency to cry wolf more often than is es- 
sential. In any case, until the crisis happens, once you’ve sent more than one 
warning the recipient is always entitled to say, “Well, you told us two months 
ago that it would happen, and it hasn’t.” 
Now, should we have spoken out? Well, we did, a bit, in two ways. First, I 
spoke to the Institute of International Finance, which is a bankers’ association, 
in April  1997. They had just issued a very upbeat report on capital flows to 
developing  countries. We  were concerned  about  some countries, including 
Thailand, but didn’t want to be too alarmist, so I included a statement to the 
effect that we really agreed with their overall favorable assessment, but we 
were sure that they had taken into account the special circumstances of coun- 
tries that had particular problems, like very large current account deficits and 
weak financial systems, and left it at that. Since it was quite likely they would 
not pay a whole lot of attention, it’s possible that all I was doing was salving 
my  conscience rather than issuing a warning to those who were prepared to 
listen carefully. Perhaps if we are to issue warnings, we should do so clearly 
and loudly. 
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from some neighboring governments to persuade Thailand to get into an LMF 
program. In response we did speak out, saying in public that Thailand needed 
a stabilization program. We  said it didn’t have to be an IMF program, but the 
government did need to take action, because the economy was heading for 
trouble. We  were told later that the statement had an impact on the debate 
inside the Thai government. That worked out as hoped, but it’s clear we will not 
ever be comfortable doing this. This is an issue with which we will continue to 
wrestle, and perhaps, when the problem is exceptionally clear-cut, we will have 
to speak out again. 
Exchange Rate Systems 
We often announce that to prevent crises countries need to have sound mac- 
roeconomic policies and a sound financial system. What about the exchange 
rate system? We generally say that if you have good macroeconomic policies, 
you’ll have a stable exchange rate. Really? Did Japan and the United States 
run unstable macroeconomic policies between 1995 and 1996? Is that why the 
exchange rate moved 50 percent in that period? 
The position that exchange rates will be stable provided policies are virtu- 
ous is not well supported by the evidence. But we’re not sure what system to 
recommend. I am skeptical about the notion of free-floating rates, particularly 
for developing countries, and believe that a country that is trying to develop 
through integration into the global economy makes the task that much more 
difficult if it does not seek in some way to stabilize the exchange rate. In an 
extreme storm, there are probably benefits to being able to let the rate move, 
but the rate still has to be defended. 
No doubt there is more to be said; but it is surprising that there is still so 
much uncertainty about this essential issue. 
Capital Controls 
There are differences among types of capital control. In the first instance 
there is a need for prudential controls on the foreign exchange exposure of 
banks and possibly other institutions. We need more work to study the effec- 
tiveness of  different types of prudential control and also to consider whether 
anything can or needs to be done to limit the exposures of nonfinancial corpo- 
rations. 
The capital inflows problem of a country that is trying to stabilize, needing 
high domestic interest rates, is a familiar and difficult one. Not many countries 
have  dealt with it successfully. Chile has. Maybe the controls have nothing 
whatever to do with Chile’s success, as some have argued, but that’s a hard case 
to make. Chile’s controls are market based, requiring a reserve deposit to be 
placed in the central bank. Such market-based measures are preferable to ad- 
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Let me also discuss the proposal to amend the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF to make liberalization of capital flows a purpose of the IMF. At present 
we have as one of our purposes the promotion of current account convertibility, 
but not capital account convertibility-though  we are allowed to require coun- 
tries to  impose capital controls in  certain circumstances. The proposal to 
amend the articles in this direction has aroused a great deal of concern in many 
developing countries, though not, I believe, warranted concern. Capital ac- 
count liberalization is something that in the long run is going to happen to 
almost every country, as current account liberalization has happened to almost 
every country. And in the long run, as financial structures strengthen, it will be 
a good thing. The purpose of this amendment is to bring some coherence to 
the process of capital account liberalization, allowing us and the profession to 
develop theories and best practices about how to go about it, to answer such 
questions as: Which controls should be removed first? Which-including  pru- 
dential controls-are  essential to keep until the very end, perhaps forever? 
Which controls are more efficient, which are less efficient? We  have answers 
to these questions for the current account. We  know that quotas are by  and 
large worse than tariffs, despite the reverse occasionally being true in very 
specific circumstances. We know something about liberalizing by cutting tar- 
iffs proportionally, and so forth. We  don’t have similar answers on the capital 
account-and  we should try to develop them. 
We  would have for the capital account, as we have for the current account, 
two statuses in the IMF. For the current account we have Article XIV and Ar- 
ticle VIII status. If  a country is in Article XIV status, it has restrictions on cur- 
rent account transactions that have been in place since it joined the IMF, and 
which should not have intensified; the country would generally be liberalizing 
these restrictions more or less gradually. Then, at some point when current 
account liberalization is complete, the country accepts the obligations of Ar- 
ticle VIII, not to impose restrictions on the current account. Most IMF mem- 
bers used to be in Article XIV status. We  now have  140 countries out of  192 
that have accepted Article VIII. For the capital account, a process that is simi- 
lar, gradual, and possibly quite slow would be likely if this amendment is ac- 
cepted. 
Multiple Equilibria and Contagion 
In dealing with a crisis, one has to ask how anyone knows how far the ex- 
change rate ought to move. At the start of the Mexican crisis, the Mexican 
government prepared a program that had a presumed current account deficit of 
about 3 percent of  GDP and some budgetary contraction and a tightening of 
monetary policy. I don’t think today that that program was inherently impos- 
sible, but it was impossible given the markets’ complete loss of confidence in 
Mexico. 
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that mean the Mexican outcome was one of possible multiple equilibria? I’m 
not sure ex post. The reason I have great difficulty deciding this question is be- 
cause of a saying of Milton Friedman’s-that  man may not be rational, but he’s 
a great rationalizer. There is no situation that you cannot explain ex post as 
having been the only thing that could possibly have happened. We  can now 
explain very convincingly why Mexico had to have  a decline in GDP of  7 
percent in 1995. If  it had been 3 percent, we could explain that as well, and 
how they managed to get by  with that with all the help they got from their 
friends, and the strong show of  support by  the international community, and 
the excellent progress and structural reform that had been made in earlier years, 
and the determination of the new president to continue it. You could write that 
scenario perfectly, and it would be just as persuasive as the description of what 
actually happened. 
So I have great difficulty knowing how we know whether the market is doing 
right, whether there isn’t another equilibrium, and what exactly is driving these 
situations. But if that’s what you start believing, then you have to ask whether 
in a crisis or otherwise, countries shouldn’t at least tentatively take a view on 
where the exchange rate should be. Of course, they can’t in these circumstances 
use reserves extensively to defend a particular rate, but they may try to use the 
interest rate to keep the rate from moving too far. 
Contagion 
Contagion exists if, given the objective circumstances, a country is more 
likely to have a crisis if  some other country is also having a crisis. The data 
show, for instance in a paper by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), that 
contagion exists, a result that is easy to believe given the European crisis, the 
Latin American crisis, and the Southeast Asian crisis. 
Some of  the contagion is understandable. Thailand’s devaluation affected 
the equilibrium value of  Indonesia’s exchange rate, and so Indonesia’s rate 
should have depreciated. But it is very hard to see why Indonesia’s exchange 
rate was driven so far-this  looks very much like an overreaction. The official 
sector, and those in the private sector who had examined the situation closely, 
believed that  Indonesia’s macroeconomic fundamentals were initially quite 
strong. If  so, there was a strong case for official intervention. This takes us to 
the next point, namely: should the IMF be lending in these circumstances and 
does that create too much moral hazard? 
Moral Hazard 
Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which sets out the purposes of 
the Fund, includes the following: “To give confidence to members by making 
the general resources of  the Fund temporarily available to them under appro- 
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ments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive 
of national or international prosperity.” We were set up in part to lend to coun- 
tries in crisis and are thus not going to tell a member that we cannot lend to it 
because of the moral hazard. Nonetheless, the issue is an important and diffi- 
cult one. 
There is moral hazard in every single insurance arrangement. We all know 
the analysis that seatbelts increase the speed at which people drive, and in- 
crease the intensity of accidents, and could even increase the number of acci- 
dents. Nonetheless, we have not decided to reduce the number of seatbelts, nor, 
as Lawrence Summers puts it, do we insert a dagger into the steering wheel, 
pointing upward, to make people drive more slowly. We accept that there are 
trade-offs among speed, the number of accidents, and the number of fatalities. 
That is also the case with the moral hazard of lending by the official sector 
in circumstances in which a country is in severe trouble, and there seems to 
be nothing else that will help it avoid taking measures destructive of national 
prosperity,  which means having  a very, very deep recession. Mexico’s 1995 
recession  was very deep. It is hard to believe it would  have been better for 
Mexico to have output decline by 12 percent instead of the 7 percent that actu- 
ally took place-and  the larger decline would have been quite possible had 
Mexico not received  financial assistance. A similar argument applies in the 
Thai case. 
But we do need to look for measures that will reduce this moral hazard, by 
finding ways of ensuring that the costs of  dealing with a problem like this are 
shared by private sector lenders. 
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I’d like to begin by applauding Paul Krugman’s paper, which is so catholic that 
I can applaud it without anybody being absolutely sure how I interpret it; and 
thus Krugman’s reputation is not endangered by being endorsed by the presi- 
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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By far the best way of dealing with a foreign exchange crisis is not to have 
one. How does one avoid a foreign exchange crisis? A variety of things have 
been suggested and can be thought of, but one starts with good macroeconomic 
policy. Moreover, good macroeconomic policy has to be accompanied by labor 
market flexibility, so that the economy can respond to changes without high 
levels of unemployment. I think that this is increasingly important because it 
is not going to be possible for elected politicians to follow a sensible, stable 
macroeconomic policy with very high unemployment rates. Very high unem- 
ployment rates over a period of time affect a stable economy politically and 
socially and therefore have to spill over into economic policy. 
A robust foreign exchange regime is required. There is no perfect foreign 
exchange regime. I prefer a floating rate regime for the same reason Churchill 
preferred democracy: it’s less bad than any of the other systems. But a perfect 
floating exchange rate regime doesn’t work perfectly well, and therefore, some 
modifications to it, especially to avoid an overvalued exchange rate, are appro- 
priate. 
It is very important for a country to develop two-way capital markets, both 
in equity and in debt and debt-related instruments. It is very helpful to have 
both a high level of foreign exchange reserves and the skill to use them. Using 
foreign exchange reserves skillfully is hardly a no-brainer. It takes some exper- 
tise in dealing in the markets, especially the expertise to make it clear to market 
participants that risk is two way, and that the central bank has the skill and the 
guts to intervene in a two-way market. 
It’s also very important to have a strong banking system because if the bank- 
ing system is weak, it is virtually impossible for the monetary authorities to 
use the interest rate tool for any period of  time to support a transitory, and 
fundamentally unjustified, weakness in the exchange rate. 
We  all know that, even with the best macroeconomic policy, things can go 
awry and the fundamentals can get out of whack, forcing adjustments in the 
existing exchange rate, exchange rate regime, or both. Making those adjust- 
ments takes courage. We like to think of Domingo Carvalho as resisting all the 
pressures against the Argentine peso, courageously standing up against the 
world markets and winning, and he deserves a great deal of praise; and those 
who supported him, especially a very well done IMF program, should share in 
that praise. But there are other times when it takes at least as much courage to 
say that change must take place. It is important that financial officials not get 
confused between attitude and intelligence in judgment. 
If one is going to make a change, the descriptions that were made in Krug- 
man’s paper and in our discussions certainly suggest that there is plenty of 
time. Markets respond to fundamental disequilibria quite slowly. And  who 
knows better than the authorities of the country that they really aren’t going to 
make it? 
The reason making changes takes courage is that, as the finance minister, 
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tough it out, to let your successor or the next administration worry about it. If 
one does that consciously, it is a serious disservice to one’s country, and not 
something that should have our admiration. 
Using that as a bit of background, I’d like to make a few comments based 
on my personal involvement in this decade’s foreign exchange crises. Let’s start 
with Europe in 1992. I think there are two interesting questions. 
Why did the United Kingdom get attacked successfully, while France got 
attacked and held? What were the differences? I think there were three factors 
in the British case. First, they entered the ERM at the wrong exchange rate. 
We  all know that, and certainly the British discovered that very quickly after 
doing it. They were operating with at least one, if not two, hands tied behind 
their back from day one. Second, the interest rate regime in Great Britain ties 
mortgage interest rates very closely to short-term interest rates. There is very 
little that one can imagine as sensitive to the electorate as their mortgage pay- 
ments. Therefore, this peculiarity in the British financial system made the high 
interest rate tool unusable for any length of time. 
Third, different from the French, British monetary authority officials are 
very pragmatic. So one could say that if it were perfectly clear they were going 
to get their brains beat out, they probably wouldn’t be likely to continue their 
current course. On the other side of  the English Channel we have the legend 
of  Napoleon’s  imperial guard: the guard dies, it does not surrender-which 
was said at Waterloo, and then most of them got blown up to show their great 
courage. That is an attitude, but it’s an attitude that’s particularly prone to ex- 
ploitation if  you happen to enjoy the benefit of  the entire postwar European 
history being based on the Franco-German connection. So market participants 
knew, however much the Bundesbank might detest having to do it, that they 
were going to back France all the way. They had no choice. 
In addition to that, a result of the French characteristic of not being happy to 
surrender on any battlefield on any day is that a good many market participants 
normally regarded as being very tough were chatting with the French officials: 
If  someone’s attacking your currency, ce nkst pus moi. I’m your supporter, I’m 
in there. And the French authorities, if that reassuring phone call didn’t come 
in, were sort of  reminding people that they had  very  long memories and a 
dirigiste economy; they could make your life very unpleasant if you wanted to 
do business in France. That combination is a partial explanation of the differ- 
ence in what happened in those two countries. 
The tequila crisis certainly was a classic situation of the fundamentals get- 
ting out of  whack, and quite obviously so. Then came the horrible political 
blows of  the two assassinations in  1994. Though one could have argued, and 
certainly the Mexican officials did, that they were going to be able to tough it 
out, get into the new administration, and come up with a good macroeconomic 
policy that would work. It didn’t. Probably the single biggest contributor was 
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some spillover effects into Mexico from the doubling of  the Fed funds rate 
between February 1994 and February 1995. 
Most of us, and all the officials on the American side, hoped, indeed thought, 
that  the  Mexican  crisis could  be  confined  to  Mexico. We  began  our  ap- 
proach to the issue with that assumption. In the period between Christmas and 
New Year’s, specifically on 27 December 1994, it became clear that it wasn’t 
working. Contagion, a word used among economists but not much among mar- 
ket practitioners, was taking place. The key country telling us that was Argen- 
tina. Argentina was being hit, not because its fundamentals were that much 
like Mexico’s, but rather because, I think, in very thin markets, emerging mar- 
ket fund managers were making the mistake of  assuming that the little guy 
would get scared to death by Mexico and bail out. 
As a matter of fact, the little guy didn’t bail out, so one could argue that the 
emerging market fund managers created a problem that didn’t need to happen. 
But at any rate it happened. What was our approach going to be? Our approach 
had to be that we couldn’t solve all the problems cropping up around the world. 
The main thing to do was to get Mexico fixed as fast as possible. That lent it- 
self to a massive response by  the government of  the United States and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
You will recall that critics of both the Fund and the U.S.  government, mainly 
from Europe, argued that if we saved the maEditus Tesobono holders from the 
consequences of their own poor judgment, everybody everywhere would have 
to be bailed out in perpetuity. There was a good deal of validity to that argu- 
ment. I cannot tell you how much effort went into thinking about how we could 
save Mexico and stick it to the Tesobono holders. Nobody could figure out how 
to do it. So the Tesobono holders got saved simply because that was a price we 
had to pay in order to achieve the greater good, which was to help Mexico and, 
hopefully, avoid the contagion effect. I think it worked reasonably well. 
A very brief remark on Hong Kong. An interesting question is: why is Hong 
Kong holding up so well, even though its stock market has been hit hard? 
Except for some days, the exchange rate is holding up pretty well. What are 
some characteristics of Hong Kong that are making that happen? 
Hong Kong’s fundamentals are good, even if you can argue that the Hong 
Kong dollar is overvalued after the devaluations of its competitor currencies. 
If  you look at the manufacturing area, most of the things counted as manufac- 
tured  exports of  Hong  Kong  aren’t  actually manufactured in  Hong  Kong. 
They’re manufactured in South China. The front end, the design, and the back 
end, the marketing and selling, are done in Hong Kong. But the manufacturing, 
which is where the exchange rate effect would be important, is done in South 
China, where the exchange rate is just fine. Clearly, the exchange rate will hurt 
Hong Kong in the invisible areas and is hurting them on tourism. How long 
that will continue I’m not altogether sure. 
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robust banking system. And going back to some comments that Arminio Fraga 
and others have made about Mexico, how do you short the Hong Kong dollar? 
Even if you use derivatives, somebody in the chain has to be borrowing Hong 
Kong dollars in order to short the currency. If you’re going to borrow a cur- 
rency, you have to find somebody who has it. There are only three banks in 
Hong Kong that normally have  large, long Hong Kong dollar positions: the 
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, the Standard and Charter Bank, and the Bank of 
China. Do you think any of those three is going to get caught going short in 
Hong Kong? Not on your life. Therefore, the technical position of Hong Kong 
is really very powerful, even in these days of derivatives. 
Now, once the crisis comes along, how does one manage it? I think, perhaps, 
and I can say it even more strongly than Stanley Fischer chose to, the IMF 
absolutely has to be the key player because conditionality must be imposed 
internationally. The amount of money needed to solve a crisis usually is not 
terribly large. The resources available to the IMF usually are large enough if 
the policy package accompanying the IMF program is good enough. Money 
isn’t the problem. If you have the fundamentals fixed, the market begins to turn. 
The Fragas of  this world are looking for a trend they can ride. You can get the 
market working with you; you don’t need vast amounts of money. 
What about conditionality? Why does the IMF have to do it? The United 
States has an immense amount of experience in its own hemisphere with the 
reasons it doesn’t work for the sovereign government of a powerful country to 
be telling a smaller, weaker country what to do. It’s almost impossible for the 
political leaders of that smaller country to allow the United States to tell them 
what to do. They don’t want to bow, and be seen to bow, to their more powerful 
neighbor. Therefore, the IMF has to provide the conditionality. 
Of course, critics of the government will say that the IMF and U.S. govern- 
ment are the same thing, but in the real world that’s not so. Believe me, we 
have  very little ability to tell the IMF how  to manage its business. Stanley 
Fischer would say, “Hell, no,” and Michel Camdessus would say something in 
French that would probably not be quotable. 
One can argue that it works pretty well in Europe, doesn’t it? With the Euro- 
pean Union, everybody works together. I think the reason it works fairly well 
is that there is not a dominant power. Even though Germany is stronger, espe- 
cially after unification, and a bit tougher and heavier than everybody else, it 
doesn’t behave that way. And because of  the very important Franco-German 
union, you  don’t have one power pushing everybody else around. It’s  much 
more a community decision. Therefore I think it works better. 
In Asia, you have two candidates for the superpower of the area. It’s almost 
certain that any borrowing countries where conditionality has to be tough, as 
it always has to be, are not going to take such conditionality easily. They would 
either decide that they didn’t like it because the Japanese were behind it, or 
they didn’t like it because China was trying to use this gimmick to take over 
Asia-which,  they would immediately assert, China has been trying to do for 463  Currency Crises 
the past 2,000 years. I don’t think it works but for different reasons than in the 
Western hemisphere, with the United States being as powerful as it is. 
Discussion Summary 
Paul Krugman noted that the economics profession is sharply divided about 
exchange rate regimes. One side heralds the use of  currency boards and sees 
little benefit from floating exchange rates. The opposing side suggests that for- 
eign exchange markets get prices right and should be followed without any 
fixing of  rates. Krugman suggested that both views are wrong and that evi- 
dence suggests that no one size fits all. He also noted that while some dimen- 
sions of  uncertainty have been incorporated into economic models, a funda- 
mental uncertainty may exist about how agents believe the world works. This 
emphasis on worldviews may explain contagion. Disparate cases, such as the 
Mexican and Argentinian cases, are tied together by the common worldview 
of  US.-trained economists in Latin America. Similarly, an Asian contagion 
may be explained by  a crisis of confidence in the system of Asian values. In 
a related vein, this distinction between worldviews may  explain the distinct 
outcomes for France and the United Kingdom in 1992. The French worldview 
couldn’t imagine dropping out of the ERM while this was always a possibility 
for the United Kingdom. 
Martin Feldstein suggested that, nonetheless, the French have paid an enor- 
mous price over the past fifteen years as a result of their adherence to the goal 
of monetary union. Krugman countered that they may not recognize it as such 
given their distinctive worldview. 
William McDonough suggested that the cases of France in 1992 and Hong 
Kong now  are related. In both cases, borrowing the underlying currency for 
shorting was extremely difficult given the dominance of a few banks. As such, 
these restrictions on access to credit amounted to informal capital controls. Mc- 
Donough also stressed the importance of  the support of  the Bundesbank in 
its willingness to ease monetary policy to maintain the level of  the franc in 
1992. 
Mervyn King expressed skepticism about the importance of the Bundesbank 
in determining the different outcomes for France and the United Kingdom in 
the European crisis. Instead, he  suggested that  Germany, France,  and  the 
United Kingdom had been at different stages in their business cycles and, con- 
sequently, had different thresholds for acceptable interest rates. The two strik- 
ing outcomes of the European crisis, King noted, were that France was reat- 
tacked in 1993 and that the two countries who dropped out in 1992, the United 
Kingdom and Italy, have had considerable success since dropping out in meet- 
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that the United Kingdom was closer than France or Germany to meeting the 
criteria with one notable exception-ERM  membership-and  had better un- 
employment performance. 
Arminio Fraga  commented that the centrality of  Bundesbank policy was 
reflected by  the importance of  a speech by  the Bundesbank president in the 
week prior to the crisis. According to Fraga, this speech was interpreted by 
speculators as providing a green light for moving against the pound. Andrew 
Crockett noted that the reference was expunged from the official record, and 
King  suggested that the source was  a wire service leak prior to the actual 
speech. 
Sebastian Edwards suggested that the experience of Mexico after the crisis 
supports the use of floating exchange rates. Similarly, he suggested that Peru 
was another situation where a crisis may have been averted through the use of 
a semifloating exchange rate. While Peru may not be out of the woods, Ed- 
wards noted, its accomplishments over the past several years have been not- 
able. 
Francisco Gil Diaz also suggested that fixed exchange rates with bands tend 
to be inherently unstable, resulting in excess reserves or dramatic losses in 
reserves. As such, freely floating regimes have fewer discontinuities, recom- 
mending them over fixed regimes with bands. Gil Diaz suggested that the New 
Zealand and Canadian experiences serve to exemplify the virtues of  cleanly 
floating regimes. Robert Feenstra added that the global sourcing procedures 
described by Carl Hahn may serve to reduce the sensitivity of firms to floating 
exchange rates. Krugman disagreed and suggested that sensitivity to floating 
exchange rates could also increase. 
Stanley Fischer responded that in the Mexican case, there had been signifi- 
cant variability in the real exchange rate during the floating period. More gen- 
erally, he suggested that the question is really whether monetary policy should 
react to changes in external accounts. Fischer argued that monetary policy 
must react to these changes and that looking only at domestic inflation is not a 
viable strategy. Indeed, the monetary conditions index used as a monetary pol- 
icy indicator in both New Zealand and Canada attempts to capture external ac- 
count conditions as an integral part of the monetary policy decision-making 
process. 
McDonough noted that a recent report of the Bank of Mexico demonstrated 
a willingness to make monetary policy a flexible tool in response to external 
account conditions. This statement by an outgoing governor indicated the im- 
portance of taking difficult political positions in order to promote sound mac- 
roeconomic policy. In a related vein, he suggested that the prevailing practice 
in the United States, where only one person speaks about the level of the ex- 
change rate and always says the same thing, is extremely valuable in providing 
a consistent message. 
King inquired if Fischer thought that early warnings of crises by  oversight 
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added that evidence from foreign exchange markets in the United States and 
Japan suggest that both speaking out and a credible threat of speaking out can 
play an influential role in markets. Given that the IMF has never spoken out, it 
would need to do so in order to establish this threat as credible. Roberto Men- 
doza noted that any release of private information in this context would repre- 
sent a breach of  confidentiality and severely affect the IMF’s future access to 
such information. Mendoza and David Mullins noted that the reference to Thai- 
land included in Fischer’s speech was quite vague. 
Fischer responded that while the comment regarding Thailand had been 
veiled, he considered it sufficiently clear. Moreover, Fischer cautioned that 
many potential crises do not happen and, accordingly, speaking out can precip- 
itate or magnify social costs rather than alleviate them. This Page Intentionally Left Blank